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In the absence of a vaccine, severe acute respiratory syndrome–coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2) transmission has been controlled by preventing person-to-
person interactions via social distancing measures. In order to re-open parts
of society, policy-makers need to consider how combinations of measures
will affect transmission and understand the trade-offs between them. We
use age-specific social contact data, together with epidemiological data, to
quantify the components of the COVID-19 reproduction number. We estimate
the impact of social distancing policies on the reproduction number by turn-
ing contacts on and off based on context and age. We focus on the impact of
re-opening schools against a background of wider social distancing measures.
We demonstrate that pre-collected social contact data can be used to provide a
time-varying estimate of the reproduction number (R). We find that following
lockdown (when R= 0.7, 95% CI 0.6, 0.8), opening primary schools has a
modest impact on transmission (R = 0.89, 95% CI 0.82−0.97) as long as
other social interactions are not increased. Opening secondary and primary
schools is predicted to have a larger impact (R = 1.22, 95% CI 1.02−1.53). Con-
tact tracing and COVID security can be used to mitigate the impact of
increased social mixing to some extent; however, social distancing measures
are still required to control transmission. Our approach has been widely
used by policy-makers to project the impact of social distancing measures
and assess the trade-offs between them. Effective social distancing, contact tra-
cing and COVID security are required if all age groups are to return to school
while controlling transmission.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early
COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.1. Introduction
The reproduction number, or the ‘R number’, has become a central statistic used
to characterize the transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome–corona-
virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Early estimates of the R number, which is the average
number of secondary cases due to a single case, range between 2.5 and 3.5
[1,2], indicating that at least 2 out of every 3 transmission events need to be pre-
vented in order to avoid an outbreak and control an ongoing epidemic. In the
UK, social distancing restrictions, including closing schools, non-essential
workplaces, universities, pubs and restaurants, introduced on 23 March 2020,






































cases and deaths. The subsequent challenge was to quantify
the effect of interventions and their easing on the R
number. It is uncertain how the relaxation of these restric-
tions, especially the physical return to school of the school-
age population, will affect the transmission of the virus,
though contact tracing and isolation of discovered cases is
anticipated to mitigate some of the impacts.
TheR number of close contact infections such as SARS-CoV-
2 depends critically onwhomeetswhom. Social contact surveys,
which typically ask about an individual’s social contacts on the
previous day, are the most direct way of assessing the potential
for spread in a population [3,4]. Several such surveys have quan-
tified the behaviour of the UK population prior to the pandemic
in 2020 [3,5,6]; they demonstrated strong age-assortative mixing
patterns and an average number of contacts per person around
12. Surveys conducted in the UK during the COVID-19 pan-
demic have shown that social distancing dramatically
decreased the average number of social interactions to less
than three contacts per person per day [7].
Social distancing measures, such as the closure of schools
and workplaces and the mandatory reduction of social
interactions, while effective at preventing transmission, have
severe economic and psychological effects, and of particular
concern is their impact on children [8]. Age-specific behaviour-
al patterns mean that social distancing measures affect age
groups differently. In normal circumstances, the majority of
social contact hours for persons over 60 years of age occur at
home while only a quarter of their social contact hours are
associatedwith leisure activities outside the home. By contrast,
nearly 60% of 20- to 30-year olds’ social contact hours are at
work [5]. Crucially, nearly half of children’s social contact
hours are made within a school setting, meaning that school
closures have a major impact on the social experience of
young people. In this study, we use social contact data [5],
including an additional targeted survey of children, to quantify
the impact of re-opening schools on theR number in theUK [9].2. Materials and methods
(a) Social contact data
Weused data from the Social Contact Survey (SCS)which surveyed
5861 individuals in the UK in 2010 about their social contacts
during a single day [5]. Participants were recruited using three
approaches: a paper survey sent to people in the post, an online
survey and an online survey aimed specifically at school-aged
children. Participants were asked to complete demographic infor-
mation about themselves including age, occupation and about
their social contacts on the previous day. Participants were asked
to report the number of people theymet, the duration of the contact
(<10 min, 10 to 59 min, 1 to 4 h, 4+ h), the context (home, work/
school, travel, other/leisure) and whether the contact involved
touch, e.g. a handshake, hug or kiss. To facilitate reporting large
numbers of contacts per day, participants could report contacts as
individual contacts or groups of contacts; this methodology
better captures the right-hand tail of the degree distribution. Partici-
pants were also asked about transitive interactions between
contacts; for more details see [5].
(b) Estimating the reproduction number from social
contact data
We use an individual-based approach to calculate an R number of
each of the participants of the SCS study [9]. The R number for anindividual is generated as a sumof all social interactions,multiplied





where k is the number of contact events reported by each partici-
pant, ni is the number of individuals in that contact (groups of
similar contacts), di is the duration of the contact and t is the prob-
ability of transmission. Because we do not have ages of contacts,
this is an ego-centric estimate of R and does not include local
depletion of susceptibles.
The population-wide reproduction number, Rt, represents the
average number of secondary cases due to an average infectious
person. As both the risk of becoming infected and the risk of
infecting others is proportional to the number of contacts, indi-
viduals with more contacts will contribute more to Rt than
individuals with fewer contacts. Therefore, Rt will depend on










where N is the number of participants in the SCS, 0  1j  1 is
the relative infectiousness of children under 11 years of age rela-
tive to adults. aj is the age-specific weighting for participant j,
estimated to match the age distribution of the UK population,
calculated as the ratio of the proportion of individuals aged a




: ð2:3Þ(c) Model calibration (estimating t)
The model can be calibrated using incidence data when the social
contact patterns are known. Here, we calibrated the model to the
exponential growth phase of the epidemic in the UK prior to the
introduction of widespread social distancing on 23 March 2020.
We estimated the growth rate, g, from death data between 13
March 2020 and 30 March 2020, then calculated the R number
as R ¼ exp(gS) where S is the serial interval.
(d) Estimating the reproduction number following
stay-at-home order on 23 March 2020
Google has made community mobility reports [10] available for the
period during COVID-19 transmission from 15 February 2020. The
Google mobility reports provide a point estimate for the percentage
change in a number of visits to, and length of stay at places categor-
ized as grocery and pharmacy, parks, transit stations, retail and
recreation, residential, and workplace. The median percentage
change is relative to the median value for the same day of the week
for the period between 3 January 2020 and 6 February 2020 [10].
We mapped the context reported in the SCS onto the Google
mobility data categories as a home is equivalent to residential,
work/school to workplace, other/leisure to retail and recreation
and travel to transit. We assumed that 100% of contacts were
active during the week of 18 March 2020. We then used the
Google mobility estimate of the percentage of contacts that were
active in subsequent weeks.
(e) Forward simulating social distancing measures
and school closures
(i) Generalized social distancing measures
To simulate x% of contacts in a given context being active, we
take a random sample without replacement of a proportion


















Figure 1. The time-varying R number in the UK, estimated using incidence
death data prior to lockdown, SCS data and Google Community Mobility






































(1 x=100) of all contacts for that context. The selected contacts
are flagged with a comply flag ci equal to 1. The reduced individ-





where dci1 equals zero if ci = 1 and one otherwise.
(ii) School closures
Primary and secondary schools were closed in the UK from 23
March 2020. It was estimated that approximately 2% of pupils
attended school during April and May 2020 as children of essen-
tial workers [11]. To simulate school closures, we remove all
contacts for the relevant school-aged children that have ‘school’
listed as the context by setting di = 0. To capture the 2% of chil-
dren who remained at school, we re-instated a random sample
of the removed contacts. We do not capture additional contacts
due to school, such as parent-to-parent contact.
(iii) ‘COVID security’
COVID security is a term used to describe the reduction in trans-
mission due to the wearing of face coverings, eye protection and
maintaining physical distancing during social interactions [12].
In the UK, face coverings became mandatory on public transport
and NHS settings in June 2020, and in shops and supermarkets
from 24 July 2020. We capture COVID security by reducing the
transmission probability t by 25% and 50%.
(iv) Contact tracing
We modelled contact tracing as implemented in the UK, that is,
triggered by a symptomatic test-positive case. For each individual,
we assign a probability of symptoms given infection based on their
age. We used the age-specific symptomatic rates estimated in
Davies et al. [13]: cases under 18 years of age have a 25% chance
of symptoms given infection, cases over 80 years of age have a
75% chance of symptoms given infection, and we impose a
linear increase with age between the two ages [13]. For each indi-
vidual, we draw a random number to determine if they are
symptomatic and eligible for contact tracing. We assume that con-
tact tracing has the effect of reducing their number of secondary
infections by the contact tracing efficacy; we consider example
scenarios where 20% and 60% of contacts are successfully traced.
For each of the Rt estimates, we calculate the mean and 95%
confidence intervals for the R number by sampling contacts then
bootstrapping contacts, weighted by age, 2000 times and taking
the percentile confidence interval.3. Results
(a) Model calibration and baseline values
We estimate that the number of deaths in the UK grew expo-
nentially with a rate of 0.23 (95% CI 0.22, 0.24) deaths per
day between 13 March 2020 and 30 March 2020. This corre-
sponds to an R number of 2.7 using a mean serial interval of
7.5 days [14–16].
We combine this estimate of the R number prior to lock-
down with social contact data to estimate a transmission
probability per contact hour of 0.002 h−1 (see Materials and
methods for interpretation of this value).
(b) Impact of the United Kingdom stay-at-home order
on 23 March 2020
Following a lockdown, we use Google Community Mobility
Reports as a proxy for the percentage reduction in activework, leisure and travel contacts. With a 65% reduction in
work contacts, a 75% reduction in leisure contacts and a
95% reduction in school contacts, the R number is reduced
to 0.7 (95% CI 0.6, 0.8) (figure 1), which is consistent with
direct estimates from social contact surveys [7].
(c) Contribution of social contacts by context
We assessed the relative importance of social contacts by
context. Preventing all leisure and other contacts, while
allowing work, school and household contacts, leads to a R
number of 2:0 ð95% CI 1:82:4Þ. Preventing work contacts
while allowing leisure and household contacts has a bigger
impact, resulting in a R number of 1:5 ð95% CI 1:41:7Þ.
Using this approach, the minimum R number without pre-
venting household contacts is 0.45 (95% CI 0.41, 0.50). We
stress that this estimate does not allow for essential contacts
outside the home due to keyworkers and essential services
but provides a lower bound for the R number in the UK.
(d) Impact of contact tracing
Tracing and isolating contacts of symptomatic cases can be
effective at reducing the R number; however, extremely
high levels of contact tracing need to be achieved for the R
number to be brought close to 1 without social distancing
measures (figure 2). As expected, the more contacts traced
per case, the more effective contact tracing is at reducing
the R number.
The absolute effectiveness of contact tracing is dependent
on concurrent social distancingmeasures.With strict social dis-
tancing similar to levels shortly after the start of the stay-at-
home order, contact tracing is able to prevent up to approxi-
mately 0.7 secondary infections per case. By contrast, with no
social distancing, contact tracing can prevent up to approxi-
mately 1.6 secondary infections per case. Assumptions about
the infectiousness of children have a minimal impact on these
conclusions (figure 2).
(e) The impact of multiple interventions and school
closures
Figure 3a–i shows the projected R number for school re-open-
ing scenarios as a function of the percentage of pre-COVID
active social contacts and varying levels of contact tracing
and COVID security.
Figure 3a represents no contact tracing or COVID security.
The R number in March 2020, with schools fully open, is
Rt









100% of contacts traced
60% of contacts traced
20% of contacts traced
no contact tracing
% active work and leisure contacts
Figure 2. The impact of tracing and isolating contacts of symptomatic cases when all children are back at school. The empty bars are under the assumption that
children under 11 years of age are as infectous as adults; the filled bars are where children under 11 years of age are half as infectious as adults. Blue bars (left most
bars in each grouping) are with 100% of contacts traced; red bars (right most bars) are with no contact tracing. (Online version in colour.)


































































































% active work and leisure contacts
schools closed
50% 5- to 11-year olds at school




(d) (e) ( f )
Figure 3. The COVID-19 R number as a function of the percentage of active work and leisure contacts under different contact tracing, COVID security and school
closure scenarios. The shaded regions indicate the values with schools closed (grey, bottom ribbons), 50% of primary school pupils attending school (cyan), all
primary school pupils at school (yellow) and primary and secondary schools open (red, top ribbons). The panels illustrate the values of the R number with (a) no
contact tracing or COVID security and with increasing measures (b–i). The number 1 marks the UK position in March 2020, number 2 marks the UK position in April/
May 2020. The width of the ribbons indicates 95% confidence intervals. These figures are generated with the assumption that children under 11 years of age are as











































































marked with the number 1, and the R number in May 2020
with schools closed to all but children of essential workers
is marked with the number 2.
Policy options can be mapped to the R number by traver-
sing across the figure panels. For example, from point 2 with
schools closed, social distancing measures could be eased so
that 40% of pre-COVID contacts occur while maintaining an
R number less than 1. However, then, in order to reopen
schools while controlling transmission, 60% effective contact
tracing would have to be introduced (figure 3c) and/or
increased COVID security (figure 3f–i).
We find that if no other social contacts outside the home
increase apart from those occurring within primary schools,
then re-opening primary schools is consistent with an R
number less than 1, R ¼ 0:89 ð95% CI 0:820:97Þ (figure 3a).
However, even a modest increase in contacts outside the
home and school, relative to post-lockdown levels, would
push the R number back above 1. In the absence of substantial
population-level immunity, the additional opening of second-
ary schools is likely to result in sustained transmission in the
population ðR ¼ 1:22, 95% CI 1:021:53Þ. In general, higher
adherence to other social distancing measures is required as
more children return to school.
We predict that contact tracing and increasedCOVID secur-
ity could increase the options for opening schools (figure 3b–i).
We assume that a given proportion of all contacts are success-
fully traced, self-isolate, and that their contribution to the R
number is effectively zero. Under a scenario similar to the situ-
ation inMay/June 2020,where 20%of contactswere effectively
traced and isolated, all pupils could return to school if COVID
security could halve transmission and 40% of other contacts
were prevented (figure 3h).
However, if 60%of contacts of symptomatic caseswere traced
and isolated, we estimate that schools could fully re-open
while maintaining control of transmission, if at least 60% of
other contacts are prevented ðR ¼ 0:92, 95% CI 0:781:1Þ
with no COVID security. In this scenario, other forms of social
distancing, including working from home and eliminating
leisure contacts, would still be required if schools were to be
fully open before a pharmaceutical solution is found. If 50%
COVIDsecurity couldbe achieved in combinationwith 60%con-
tact tracing, then potentially low levels of social distancingmight
be required (figure 3i).
Repeating the analysis under the assumption that children
are less infectious than adults yields similar conclusions.
If children are less infectious than adults then re-opening pri-
mary and secondary schools has a smaller impact on the R
number, but the impact of increasing other contacts outside
home and school settings remains the same.4. Discussion
In this paper, we present a method for mapping social distan-
cing policies to an R number for COVID-19 using social
contact data. Focusing on school closures and their sub-
sequent re-opening, we explore the balance between social
distancing, contact tracing and COVID security that is
required to control transmission. Our findings suggest that
high adherence to social distancing outside school settings
is needed to maintain epidemic control without effective con-
tact tracing and/or COVID security. Opening primary
schools has a modest impact on R number, while openingsecondary schools is predicted to have a larger overall
impact, but that keeping all schools open should be feasible
with a combination of other measures.
Our findings support the use of contact tracing as a key part
of epidemic control; however, tracing needs to be highly effec-
tive. After the introduction of Test, Trace and Isolate in the UK
only 20% of social contacts of cases were successfully traced
and isolated within 48 h, though this has substantially
increased over time [17]. While tracing 20% of contacts has a
positive impact on the R number, it is insufficient to prevent
epidemic growth if all schools are fully open.
The greater risk arises from contact with people outside
the home and school contexts. It is likely that the reopen-
ing of schools will also lead to an increase in contacts made
outside school, due to caregivers returning to work and
interactions between parents. A strength of this analysis is its
predictive value regarding the effect of combined interven-
tions. Using metrics of adherence to social distancing
measures, such as Googlemobility or contemporary social con-
tact surveys, it is possible tomap a country’s progression out of
lockdown and therefore estimate the effect of policy changes on
the R number [18].
Other studies have used social contact data to characterize
the impact of social distancing measures on COVID-19 trans-
mission. Retrospective estimates of the R number have been
mapped to social distancing policies post-implementation to
estimate the relative effectiveness of measures [19,20]. In these
analyses, re-opening schools were associated with an increase
in the R number, although it is not possible to discriminate
between social contacts in education and other settings. The lim-
ited data on young people’s contact patterns makes simulating
the impact of school closures challenging. Simulations which
included a fixed increase in work and community contacts as
a result of schools re-opening found that the associated increase
in incidence could be mitigated by effective contact tracing and
additional testing [21,22] and that school closures on their own
were not sufficient to reduce the R number to below unity
[23], in line with our conclusions.
The limited understanding of young people’s contact pat-
terns is one of the limitations of our analysis, and our
approach does not include some of the complexities and non-
linearities observed in disease dynamics. The SCS data that
we used are built up around disconnected ‘egos’, so our
approach does not capture household structures, clusters, cli-
ques and higher-level social organization which influence
epidemic spread at a population level. Furthermore, as the
epidemic progresses, immunity plays an increasingly impor-
tant role in dynamics. Our approach uses the basic R number
to characterize transmission and therefore does not capture
the build-up of immunity in a population as all contacts are
assumed to be susceptible to infection. Depending on the
age distribution of immunity, social distancing measures are
likely to lead to different changes in the R number.
This analysis was made possible by pre-existing detailed
social contact data. Social contact patterns have been used
to characterize the potential for disease transmission in a
population [24], design vaccine and control programmes for
infectious diseases including influenza [25], meningitis [26]
and now COVID-19 [7]. However, in many settings, such
data are out of date or not available. Given their proven
value, we argue that regular, representative social contact sur-
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Figure 4. An early version of the “ready reckoners” showing the relationship
between the reproduction number and social distancing outside the home.







































Before the development of a vaccine or pharmaceutical con-
trol, COVID-19 transmission was primarily controlled by
reducing social contacts. The impact of social distancing on
transmission is entirely dependent on social contact patterns,
and therefore social contact surveys that were conducted
prior to the pandemic became essential for quantifying the
impact of the lockdown and the potential impact of easing.
The figures of the type shown in figure 3 in this paper
were nick-named the “ready reckoners” by SPI-M because
they allow policy makers to easily compare the likely
impact of different combinations of policy options. Various
forms of the ready reckoners have now been requested and
used to evaluate the balance between Test-Trace-Isolate,
COVID-security, mass testing and vaccination rollout.
The ready reckoners were initially developed as part of
the Interdisciplinary Task and Finish Group on the Role of
Children in Transmission, “Modelling and behavioural
science responses to scenarios for relaxing school closures”
in April 2020. Multiple modelling groups independently pre-




part of this analysis, it became clear to us that the absolute
effect of schools being open or closed was minimal compared
to the background of other social distancing: the difference
between schools being open and closed was equivalent
to an approximately 20% change in adherence to social
distancing measures.
The original ready reckoners contained an inverted horizon-
tal axis, representing social distancing in terms of adherence
(to social distancing restrictions) outside the home – see
figure 4. “Adherence” or “compliance” to social distancing
was suggested to be a weighted term, so the SPI-M chairs
proposed changing the horizontal axis to the more descrip-
tive “% of active work and leisure contacts”. We decided
not to draw the median (or mean) line on the ready reck-
oners, to improve communication of uncertainty, and
instead to represent the 95% confidence range with shaded
regions.Data accessibility. SCS data are available at http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/
54273/. Data, code and an example implementation are available at
github.com/ellen-is/reckoners.
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